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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Todd William Carver appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of the first-degree murder of three-year-old
D.B.

Statement Of The Facts
Angela and her two sons, three-year-old D.B. and one-year-old J.W.
moved in with Carver and his grandmother in mid-January 2011.

(Tr., Vol. 3,

p.691, L.14 - p.692, L.13.) Carver agreed to watch Angela's children while she
worked. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.694, Ls.6-22.) On March 3, 2011, while Carver was home
alone with Angela's children, purportedly taking care of them, he called 911 to
report that he found D.B. on the floor "rigid" and barely breathing. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.195, L.23 - p.197, L.12.) Carver claimed he had given D.B. some donuts and
that D.B. fell off his bed and choked on a donut. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.197, Ls.1-4; Vol.
2, p.258, L.18 - p.260, L.10.) When law enforcement and emergency medical
personnel responded, they discovered Carver sitting on the couch inside holding
D.B.

(Tr., Vol. 2, p.253, Ls.4-9; p.308, Ls.5-8.)

D.B. was "bluish" and not

breathing. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.255, Ls.5-12; p.310, Ls.18-20.) D.B. was transported to
the hospital where he was sent by life-flight to a different hospital at which he
died the next day. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.323, Ls.2-4.)
Both the officers on scene and all medical personnel who saw D.B. noted
numerous bruises all over D.B.'s body. (Tr., Vol. 2, pp.317-319, 339-40, 364-65,
374-75, 391-93, 444-47.) D.B. had bruises on his face, neck, back, chest, arms,
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legs, buttocks, penis, and on his foot. (Tr., Vol. 2, pp.391-93, 444-47; Exhibits 122, 39-41.) D.B. had also suffered bilateral subdural hematomas caused by blunt
force trauma that ultimately resulted in his brain herniating. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.450,
Ls.9-15, p.453, Ls.4-5; Vol. 3, p.594, L.5 - p.595, L.13, p.622, Ls.18-21.) D.B.
was pronounced dead on March 4, 2011. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.551, L.14.)
There was substantial evidence contradicting Carver's claims regarding
what precipitated his call to 911 on March 3, 2011. Inconsistent with Carver's
story that D.B. had been eating donuts was the absence of any food in D.B.'s
mouth or evidence that D. B. had eaten donuts in his bedroom, and the fact that
Carver's grandmother said Carver was very protective of his sweets and had
disciplined D.B. in the past for taking his candy. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.311, L.1 - p.312,
L.6, p.314, L.25 - p.316, L.1, p.412, Ls.5-7, p.414, L.22 - p.415, L.12, p.424,
L.22 - p.427, L.17.) D.B.'s injuries were also inconsistent with Carver's claim
that he fell from his bed and Carver was unable to explain the numerous bruises
all over D.B.'s body. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.622, Ls.23-25.) Although Carver provided a
few explanations for some of the bruises, his explanations were inadequate to
explain the extent of D.B.'s injuries.

(Tr., Vol. 3, p.610, L.14 - p.614, L.24.)

Moreover, there was evidence that Carver was abusive toward D.B. and, in
February 2011, after D.B. began living with Carver, staff at D.B.'s preschool
reported concerns about abuse to law enforcement. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.187, L.18 p.190, L.6; Vol. 2, pp.412-13, 433-35.)
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The state charged Carver with first-degree murder. (R., pp.12-13, 37-38.)
At Carver's original pretrial conference, 1 defense counsel noted: "the Court had
indicated off the record about a week or so ago that mister -- it was aware of a
letter that Mr. Carver had sent the Court." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.42, Ls.20-23.) The court
stated it was "told there was a letter" but it did not read it and instead sent copies
to counsel. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.42, L.24 - p.43, L.2.) Defense counsel advised the
court "it was Mr. Carver's attempt to essentially file a motion with the Court
asking for different counsel to be appointed in this case." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, Ls.710.)

Specifically, Carver wanted the court to appoint the same attorney to

represent him in his murder trial that was appointed to represent him on a parole
violation.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, Ls.12-17.)

Defense counsel further informed the

court that Carver did not believe counsel was "presenting an adequate defense
or producing adequate evidence." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, Ls.17-21.) When asked if
that was his opinion, Carver responded, "Yes." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, L.23.) Defense
counsel represented his disagreement with Carver's position, but admitted he
and Carver "ha[d] very different views of this case and how it ought to proceed
and what ought to be done." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.2.)

The court

advised Carver to file a formal motion and it would "deal with it" or Carver could
"hire whoever he wants to hire" if he had the ability to do so. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.44,
Ls.6-11.)

In the meantime, the court would not address the issue "without a

1

Carver's trial was originally set to begin on August 8, 2011, with the pretrial
conference set for July 26, 2011. (R., p.39.) At the original July 26, 2011 pretrial
conference, Carver asked the court to reset the trial to September 19, 2001, the
alternative trial date previously identified as a "second setting." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.39,
L.20 - p.40, L.16.) The court granted the request. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.41, Ls.6-8.)
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formal motion ... and giving the State an opportunity to look into it and argue it"
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.44, Ls.11-14.)
More than one month later, Carver, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss Counsel.

(R., p.95.)

The motion stated it was made at Carver's

"express direction" and was "for reasons [Carver] [would] articulate on the record
at the hearing of this motion." (R., p.95.) On September 13, 2011, five days after
the motion was filed and the date set for hearing on Carver's motion, defense
counsel submitted an affidavit in support of Carver's Motion to Dismiss Counsel.
(Ex Pa rte Affidavit of Gregory C. Dickison in Support of the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Counsel, Filed Under Seal2 ("Affidavit").)

In his Affidavit, defense

counsel stated that, on that same date (September 13, 2011 ), he met with Carver
at the jail and, during that meeting, Carver "became agitated" and said he did not
want to discuss his case anymore. (Affidavit, p.1.) Defense counsel averred he
"continued to make a point" to Carver and Carver "quickly became more
agitated," "shouted" at defense counsel, and "struck the side of his fist hard on
the door behind him." (Affidavit, p.1.) Carver also looked at defense counsel in a
manner that counsel interpreted as a "menacing glare." (Affidavit, p.1.) Carver
eventually "shouted for jail staff to come get him" and was transported back to his
cell. (Affidavit, p.1.) While being transported, Carver "continued to make angry
comments," "yell," and "strike things."

(Affidavit, pp.1-2.)

Defense counsel

further averred:
2

This affidavit was sent to the Idaho Supreme Court as a "Confidential Exhibit"
after Carver filed an objection to the record in district court seeking its inclusion
along with the presentence report. (Letter from Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk, dated
May 15, 2012 (file folder).)
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When the defendant made his outburst the defendant and I
were discussing a fundamental point regarding how the defendant's
case should proceed. Ongoing disagreement on that fundamental
point is what I believe is the basis for the defendant's motion to
dismiss me as his counsel. Although the disagreement has been
long-standing, I have not before this seen it as rising to the level of
good cause upon which I could base a motion to withdraw, and
therefore I continued to work with the defendant in an effort to
resolve the case. I now believe that the defendant's behavior is
good cause for me to withdraw or to be dismissed.
(Affidavit, p.2.)
Defense counsel explained he believed Carver's behavior constituted
"good cause" for the appointment of new counsel because counsel "felt
threatened by [Carver's] conduct" such that counsel "fear[ed] for [his] safety
should [he] continue to represent" Carver.

(Affidavit, p.2.) Based on counsel's

review of the discovery and his "previous interactions" with Carver, counsel
expressed a belief that Carver "is fully capable of doing [him] harm" and he "no
longer [felt] safe meeting with [Carver] unless [Carver] is in a cell" and did not
"feel safe sitting next to [him] at counsel table unless [Carver] is sufficiently
shackled." (Affidavit, p.2.) Counsel concluded:
I believe the defendant was genuinely angry and that he intended
to make me feel threatened. Regardless of his intent, I did feel
threatened by his conduct. The defendant's conduct and my fear
for my safety will be a distraction to me throughout the trial and any
subsequent proceedings, and I will not be able to impartially and
zealously represent the defendant or advocate on his behalf.
I therefore request that the court grant the defendant's
motion and dismiss me or allow me to withdraw from this case.
(Affidavit, pp.2-3.)
The court conducted a hearing on Carver's Motion to Dismiss Counsel at
which the court inquired of Carver, defense counsel, and the transport deputies
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involved in Carver's outburst on September 13, 2011. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp.98-114.)
After considering the information submitted to it, the court denied Carver's Motion
to Dismiss Counsel {Tr., Vol. 1, p.117, Ls.19-20), but advised: "If something else
happens between now and Monday we'll look at it" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.122, Ls.24-25).
No other issue was raised regarding any further disagreement between Carver
and defense counsel and the case proceeded to trial.
The jury found Carver guilty of first-degree murder and the court imposed
a fixed life sentence. (R., pp.146, 153-56.) Carver filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.158-161.)
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ISSUES

Carver states the issue on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when it did not conduct an adequate
inquiry into the conflict of interest identified by defense counsel, and
when it denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw despite a
clear conflict of interest?
2.
Did the district court deprive Mr. Carver of his constitutional
rights to due process and a jury trial when it failed to instruct the
jury that, before it could find him guilty of felony murder by
aggravated battery of a child under twelve years of age, it was
required to find that he had the specific intent to commit the crime
of aggravated battery and cause great bodily harm to Dominick?
3.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of
mitigating circumstances, including Mr. Carver's relative youth, and
its incorrect conclusion that aggravating factors were present, it
imposed a fixed life sentence following his conviction for felony
murder?

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Carver failed to establish either that the district court's inquiry into the
alleged conflict was inadequate or that the court erred in declining to appoint
substitute counsel?
2.
Has Carver failed to show that the elements instructions, which comport
with established law, resulted in error, much less fundamental error?
3.
Has Carver failed to show that imposition of a fixed life sentence for the
beating death of a three-year-old boy is unreasonable under any view of the
facts?

7

ARGUMENT

I.
Carver Has Failed to Establish That The District Court's Inquiry Into The Alleged
Conflict Of Interest Was Inadequate Or That The Court Erred In Failing To
Appoint Substitute Counsel
A.

Introduction
Carver asserts "the district court erred when it did not conduct an

adequate inquiry into the conflict of interest identified by defense counsel, and
when it denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw from the case due to his
conflict of interest."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Application of the relevant legal

standards to the facts shows the court's inquiry was adequate and the court did
not err in declining to appoint substitute counsel. Carver has failed to establish
otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon

a showing of good cause; such decision lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009)

(citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002)).
"Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion." ,U;l An abuse of discretion will only be found if the denial of such a
motion results in the abridgment of the accused's right to counsel.
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kl

The adequacy of a court's inquiry into an alleged conflict of interest is a
constitutional issue over which this Court exercises free review. Severson, 147
Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424 (citation omitted).

C.

The Court Conducted An Adequate Inquiry Into The Alleged Conflict
1.

The Alleged Conflict And The Court's Inquiry

As Carver notes, there were two grounds offered in support of his Motion
to Dismiss Counsel and counsel's related request to withdraw. (Appellant's Brief,
p.12.) Carver wanted counsel dismissed because he did not believe counsel
was adequately representing him. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.99, L.15 - p.101, L.9.) In his
Affidavit, counsel argued dismissal or withdrawal was appropriate because his
relationship with Carver had deteriorated to the point that he felt fearful of Carver.
(Affidavit.) On appeal, Carver only challenges the court's actions in relation to
counsel's asserted basis for the appointment of substitute counsel. (Appellant's
Brief, p.12.)
With respect to counsel's Affidavit that was filed the same day of the
hearing, the court noted it had not yet reviewed the Affidavit and asked counsel
whether it was "in support of Mr. Carver's motion for substitute counsel, or ... in
support of a motion to withdraw[.]" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.102, Ls.15-19.) Counsel stated
it was "more in the nature of a support -- in support of a motion to withdraw" and
acknowledged the Affidavit was not provided to the state because it was his
opinion that it would "compromise Mr. Carver's position with the State." (Tr., Vol.
1, p.102, Ls.20-25.) Although the court did not review the Affidavit prior to the
hearing, it is apparent from the court's questions at the hearing that it was
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reviewing the Affidavit during the course of the hearing. 3 (See, ~' Tr., Vol. 1,
p.104, Ls.10-11 (court inquires whether either of the officers present were the
ones that removed Carver from the attorney visiting room).)
Regarding the allegations in the Affidavit, the court inquired of the
deputies currently in the courtroom about what they observed in terms of
Carver's behavior after his meeting with counsel that morning. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.104,
Ls.16-20.) The deputies confirmed that Carver was angry and hit walls, but the
only word they heard him say was, "enough." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.104, L.20 - p.105,
L.21.) When asked whether they heard Carver make any comments they "would
consider to be a threat toward [defense counsel]," only one deputy responded,
stating: "He was definitely angry when he left.

But I don't -- nothing verbally

except for enough." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.106, L.22 - p.107, L.3.)
After hearing from the deputies, the court advised Carver that, while
certain decisions were within his sole control, such as whether to proceed to trial
and whether to testify, the presentation of evidence and trial strategy were
ultimately counsel's decisions. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.107, L.4 - p.108, L.19.) The court
then engaged in the following exchange with Carver.
THE COURT: I am concerned that -- and I've had clients who are
angry at me, too. It comes with the job. But is this a situation
where, I mean, you're just trying to get another attorney who's
going to turn around and tell you the same thing that Mr. Dickison is
and you're going to be mad at them?
[CARVER]: No. I believe that they would actually put in a little more
effort. I don't feel he's doing anything. He's not even trying to
defend me. He's basically agreeing with everything the prosecutor
To the extent Carver attempts to imply otherwise (see, ~. Appellant's Brief,
p.9), the implication is not supported by the record.
3
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said. I haven't heard one thing on his own behalf that supports me
pretty much. It's all, well [the prosecutor] said this. We're going off
this. Well, I think this, too. So basically like he's a prosecutor
prosecuting me as well.
THE COURT: I understand that's your point of view. That's not
necessarily Mr. Dickison's point of view because that's not what he
gets paid to do. He's not a prosecutor. But I am concerned about
the outbursts, something to the words of enough, in other words,
does that mean that you're not talking to Mr. Dickison and refuse to
talk to him about anything?
[CARVER]: Yep.
THE COURT: You understand, obviously, if we go to trial next
Monday and you're not talking to your attorney it's not going to be
any good.
[CARVER]: Yeah. Well, this morning's thing was more of I tried to
end it. He wouldn't allow me to end it. So I ended it myself.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you need to understand that the only
person that can relieve Mr. Dickison from his representation is me.
[CARVER]: Yeah.
THE COURT: You don't get to fire him, and he doesn't get to
withdraw or quit without my permission, and it has to be for good
cause. I'm not sure I'm seeing good cause yet. You can represent
yourself, if you want to, and Mr. Dickison can act as stand-by
counsel. There's a lot of potential dangers with doing that. Of
course, you always have the right to hire your own attorney if you
had some sort of family help or funds to do that. Is that going to
happen?
[CARVER]: I don't have the funds to be able to hire one for this.
THE COURT: Your family is not going to help you there?
[CARVER]: Can't afford it.
THE COURT: You want to represent yourself?
[CARVER]: I do not want to represent myself.
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THE COURT: Your actions, this morning, the words that you said,
hitting the wall or whatever you did, what was the purpose of all
that?
[CARVER]: I just had enough. It seems like every time he comes
and visits me it's the same thing. We start arguing over and over
about the same thing. I'm not going to plead guilty to something I
didn't do even if it is a lesser crime. I don't care how far down it
goes I'm not going to admit any guilt to something I did not do.
THE COURT: ... If you're not guilty you should plead not guilty.
So if we proceed on Monday with a not guilty plea how do you see
your being able to work with Mr. Dickison?
[CARVER]: I guess if that's what has to be, but as far as I know
told [sic] there's nothing presented in my behalf because I don't
have a defense. I thought that's what a defense attorney was for.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.19-p.111, L.20.)
The court explained that defense attorneys can present a defense without
calling witnesses, reminded Carver it was his decision whether to testify, and
asked defense counsel what witnesses he intended to call. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.111,
L.25 - p.112, L.16.) Defense counsel declined to respond, stating he was "not
comfortable disclosing that information" but noted he had disclosed potential
witnesses to the state. (Tr., Vol.1, p.112, Ls.17-18, p.113, Ls.13-25.)
The court then directly asked Carver whether it was his intent to threaten
defense counsel that morning. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, Ls.1-3.) Carver responded:
"At that moment, yes." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, L.4.) The court inquired whether it was
intended as a physical threat, and Carver said, "Not physically, no." (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.114, Ls.5-6.) The court next asked defense counsel whether he wanted to be
"heard on [his] motion to withdraw any further[.]"
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(Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, Ls.7-8.)

Counsel responded: "No, Your Honor. I have nothing further to add." (Tr., Vol.
1, p.114, Ls.9-10.)
After hearing the state's position on the issue, which was that current
counsel should remain because it appeared Carver was just frustrated (Tr., Vol.
1, p.114, L.20 - p.116, L.22), the court asked defense counsel: "[D]o you feel
that you can and would be prepared for trial on Monday?" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.116,
Ls.23-24).

Counsel answered, "Yes."

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.116, L.25.)

The court

followed-up:
THE COURT: Even if Mr. Carver chooses not to -- cooperate is the
wrong word, but anyway not to communicate with you in any way,
shape or form between now and then?
MR. DICKISON: I would still be prepared to proceed to trial on
Monday. It would hamper things.
THE COURT: Obviously, yeah. Mr. Carver, if Mr. Dickison is not
permitted to withdraw and if we go to trial on Monday what's your
position? Are you just going to withdraw inside yourself and not
communicate with Mr. Dickison, or are you going to try and
continue to try and talk to him, work with him.
[CARVER]: I guess I'll try to continue to work with him because
apparently everything is out of my control.
THE COURT: Three things are not out of your control 4 . Everything
else is -- seems like it's out of your control, put it that way, but
obviously you have some input. The motion to withdraw will be
denied at this point.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.1-20.)

4

The three things the court was referring to related back to his earlier discussion
with Carver regarding the decisions Carver had complete control of - how to
plead, whether to have a jury trial, and whether to testify. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.107,
Ls.6-12.)
13

2.

The Court Conducted An Adequate Inquiry Into The Alleged
Conflict And Carver Has Failed To Establish Error In The Court's
Decision Not To Appoint Substitute Counsel

The state and federal constitutions guarantee an indigent defendant the
right to court-appointed, conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,
271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). When
a trial court has reason to believe a conflict exists, the court has a duty to inquire
about the conflict. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980); Severson, 147
Idaho at 703, 215 P.3d at 423. "A trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry, under
certain circumstances, will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's
conviction." Severson, 147 Idaho at 703, 215 P.3d at 423. "[O]nce a defendant
raises a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is constitutionally obligated to
determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists." !Q.,_ (citations omitted). "A
court's failure to make a proper inquiry after a defendant's timely objection will
result in the automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction." Id.
In addressing what constitutes an adequate inquiry, the Idaho Supreme
Court has stated: "The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the
defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern." Severson, 147 Idaho at 704,
215 P.3d at 424 (citation and quotations omitted). "[l]n determining whether a
conflict exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on representations made by
counsel." !Q.,_ (citation omitted).

"A court may inquire further into facts, but is

under no original or continuing obligation to do so." !Q.,_ (citation and quotations
omitted).
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As detailed above, the court in this case held a hearing on the motion,
considered information from deputies who were aware of the situation, and
allowed both Carver and counsel to address the potential conflict. This inquiry
into the information contained within counsel's Affidavit was more than adequate.
See Severson, 147 Idaho at 705, 215 P.3d at 425. Carver's contention otherwise
lacks merit.
Carver argues the court's inquiry was inadequate because the court "did
not inquire into defense counsel's ability to provide competent and diligent
representation (which is different than simply being ready to participate at trial on
a given date)," and "did not inquire as to whether Mr. Carver had provided written
consent for defense counsel to continue representing him despite the conflict of
interest." (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) According to Carver, both inquiries were
required by l.R.P.C. 1.7. Carver's reliance on l.R.P.C. 1.7 is misplaced. The
analytical

framework

applicable to

Carver's

conflict claim

is

the

Sixth

Amendment, not l.R.P.C. 1.7. While Rule 1.7's prohibition against concurrent
conflicts of interest may embody certain constitutional principles when applied to
criminal cases, it does not define the Sixth Amendment, nor does the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' Ethics Advisory Committee's ("NACOL
Committee") interpretation of ABA's similar Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.7.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)

Carver's own argument reveals why his

reliance on l.R.P.C. 1.7 would be inappropriate in addressing whether he was
afforded the conflict-free counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
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According to Carver, the court's inquiry into the conflict was inadequate
because the court did not "satisfy" "two of the four requirements that must be
satisfied to qualify for an exception" under l.R.P.C. 1.7. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
Specifically, Carver notes the court did not ascertain whether defense counsel
believed he would be able to "provide competent and diligent representation to"
Carver, I.RP .C. 1.7(b)(1 ), or get "informed consent" from Carver "in writing,"
LR.P.C. 1.7(b)(4).

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

Exactly how Carver could

constitutionally consent to counsel's alleged conflict in this case is a mystery. If
counsel, in fact, could not diligently represent Carver within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment as a result of any fear of Carver, the correct response under
the Sixth Amendment would be to appoint substitute counsel, not to have Carver
give "informed consent" to be represented by counsel. Carver's claim that the
court's inquiry was inadequate for failing to "satisfy" the criteria under l.R.P.C.
1.7(b) fails as no such inquiry was appropriate, much less required.
Although the state submits l.R.P.C. 1.7(b) does not govern the analysis,
the state concedes a court should inquire as to whether counsel is capable of
representing a defendant when counsel has indicated that he cannot do so due
to his fear of the defendant. However, the court satisfied that obligation in this
case. After hearing the representations from the deputies that Carver did not
actually threaten defense counsel, allowing Carver to voice his concerns, and
clarifying that Carver did not intend any of his comments or actions as a physical
threat, the court asked defense counsel if he had anything to add. Counsel said
he did not and subsequently advised the court that he felt he could and would be
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prepared to proceed to trial. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, Ls.7-10, p.116, Ls.23-25.) That
Carver chooses to interpret counsel's responses as insufficient to show any sort
of retraction from the position stated in the Affidavit does not mean that defense
counsel did not determine, based on Carver's comments and demeanor at that
hearing, that he could zealously represent Carver at trial despite the earlier
interaction. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) And it certainly does not mean the court's
inquiry was inadequate because the court did not ask the precise questions
Carver claims on appeal should have been asked. See Severson, 147 Idaho at
704, 215 P.3d at 424 ("Although the court did not ask the specific questions
[Carver] now claims were necessary, [Carver] was given the opportunity to draw
the trial court's attention to his specific concerns, but failed to do so.").
"Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict
actually exists." Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424 (citation omitted).
Carver, quoting the NACOL Committee's interpretation of ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1. 7, asserts "a threat of bodily harm by a client against a
lawyer creates a personal conflict of interest." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Carver's
reliance on this principle, even if relevant to the Court's analysis, is unwarranted
because there is no evidence that Carver threatened defense counsel with bodily
harm.

Indeed, the evidence establishes the opposite.

Thus, there was no

conflict based on a threat of bodily harm.
The fact that defense counsel felt threatened at the conclusion of his
meeting with Carver on September 13, 2011, also does not necessarily result in
a conflict that required the court to appoint substitute counsel; at best it triggers
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an inquiry by the court, which is precisely what happened. As noted, the court's
inquiry included asking defense counsel for further input and if he could and
would be prepared for trial.

At no time during the hearing on the motion did

counsel state that, despite the information presented to the court, he remained
too fearful to represent Carver.

Defense counsel is not a potted plant; if he

believed his concerns regarding his safety were not adequately addressed or
alleviated at the hearing, he could have said as much. Instead, he told the court
he was prepared to represent Carver at trial and he never expressed any
subsequent concern despite the court's invitation that he could do so.

5

(Tr., Vol.

1, p.122, Ls.24-25.)
Because Carver has failed to establish that the district court did not satisfy
its duty of inquiry, he has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to reversal of his
conviction on this basis, and he has otherwise failed to show error in the court's
decision not to appoint substitute counsel.

5

Carver also argues that defense counsel demonstrated in his Affidavit that his
"personal interests controlled over those of his client when he asserted that he
would not feel comfortable appearing in court with Mr. Carver unless he was
'sufficiently shackled."' (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Carver further argues, "No
defense attorney acting in his client's interests would request that a trial court
shackle his client during trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) While counsel did
indicate in his Affidavit that he would not "feel safe" unless Carver was
"sufficiently shackled" (Affidavit, p.2), he never actually asked the court to have
Carver restrained either at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss Counsel
conducted on September 13, 2011, or at the hearing held on September 15,
2011, when the court, on its own, stated Carver would have "ankle chains," which
was "normal[ ]." but no "belly chains." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.142, Ls.12-13.) The court
also noted a requirement that there be an officer present "when a person is
incarcerated," and directed the officers where to sit. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.142, Ls.2023.) Notably, counsel did not, at any point during this discussion, mention the
need for additional or different security measures due to any ongoing fear he was
experiencing.
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II.
Carver Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Elements Instruction
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Carver argues that the district court erred by

failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of first-degree murder.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-26.)

Carver has failed to establish the elements

instruction resulted in fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261
P.3d 853, 864 (2011 ).

"An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible

error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Id.
(citations omitted).

C.

Carver Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Establishing Fundamental
Error With Respect To The Elements Instruction
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). This same
principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See l.C.R. 30(b) ("No party
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the
instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."). Absent
a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged
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error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227,
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Review

under the fundamental

demonstrate that each error he alleges:

error doctrine requires

Carver to

"(1) violates one or more of [his]

unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this threeprong test to Carver's claim of instructional error shows that Carver has failed to
meet his burden.
Pursuant to l.C. § 18-4003(d), the state charged Carver with first-degree
murder "committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate the crime of
Aggravated Battery, on a child under twelve (12) years of age." (R., p.37.) With
respect to this charge, the jury received the following instructions:

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
In order for the defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder
in the perpetration of an aggravated battery upon a child under
twelve (12) years of age, the state must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about March 3, 2011,

2.

in the state of Idaho[,)

3.

Todd William Carver committed an aggravated battery
upon [D.B.,]

4.

Which caused [D.B.] great bodily harm,

5.

From which bodily harm [D.B.] died, and
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6.

That [D.B.], at the time of his death, was under twelve
(12) years of age.

To prove Todd William Carver guilty of first degree murder in
this way, the state does not have to prove that the defendant
intended to kill [D.S.], but the state must prove that during the
perpetration of an aggravated battery on a child under twelve (12)
years of age, the defendant killed [D.S.].
If you find that the state has failed to prove any of the above,
you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder. If you
find that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of first degree
murder.
(R., p.190 (bold and capitalization original).)

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
An "aggravated battery" is a "battery" that causes great
bodily harm,
A "battery" is committed when a person:
(1) willfuly [sic] and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the
person of another; or
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another
person against the will of the other; or
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual.
An act is "willful" or done "willfully" when done on purpose.
One can act willfully without intending to violate the law, without
intending to injure another or without intending to acquire any
advantage.
(R., p.191 (bold and capitalization original).)
Carver concedes he did not object to the elements instructions, which
accurately reflect the pattern jury instructions, 6 but contends he is entitled to relief

6

Compare ICJI 704C ("felony murder"), 1203 (battery defined), 1207 (aggravated
battery).
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under the fundamental error doctrine because, he argues, the instructions
"omitted an essential element of the crime for which he was charged."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.16, 23.) Specifically, Carver claims that, in order to convict
him of first-degree murder, the jury had to find he "had the requisite mental state
to commit an aggravated battery" and find "that he had the specific intent to
cause great bodily harm to [D.B.]." (Appellant's Brief, p.20 (emphasis omitted).)
Carver further asserts the jury was instead "specifically told that it did not have to
find that [he] had any intent to commit a murder, commit aggravated battery, or
cause physical harm to [D.B.] in order to find [him] guilty of first degree murder."
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

Carver has failed to show any error, much less

fundamental error, that would entitle him to relief.
Idaho law is clear that, in order to prove a defendant is guilty of firstdegree murder resulting from the perpetration of an aggravated battery on a child
under 12, '"the state does not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill,"
but only has to prove "that during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate" the
aggravated battery, the victim died. (ICJI 704C and comments.) Instruction No.
4 accurately restates IC.JI 704C and the state's burden of proof. As such, it was
not error to give the instruction. See McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2,
225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) ("The l.C.J.1. are presumptively correct.

Trial

courts should follow the l.C.J.I. as closely as possible to avoid create
unnecessary grounds for appeal.").
Instruction No. 5 also incorporates the relevant l.C.J.I, and is an accurate
statement of the law as explained in State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 493-95, 259
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P.3d 629, 639-41 (Ct. App. 2011 ), review denied, and State v. Carlson, 134
Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000). That Carver disagrees with the holdings in
Grove and Carlson falls far short of establishing fundamental error.

Quite the

contrary, that the district court followed the law and that defense counsel did not
object to the court doing so show there was no error and certainly no plain error.
Indeed, Carver's disagreement with established precedent is "irrelevant in the
context of fundamental error where the error must be plain under current law."
Grove, 151 Idaho at 494, 259 P.3d at 640 (emphasis original).
Carver's claim of instructional error, raised for the first time on appeal,
fails.

111.
Carver Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence For The First-Degree Murder Of Three-Year-Old
D.B.
A.

Introduction
Carver argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed

life sentence, asserting the court "failed to give sufficient consideration to the
mitigating factors present in this case" and erroneously "concluded that
aggravating factors were present when they were not." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.)
Carver's arguments lack merit.

Application of well-established sentencing

standards to the facts presented to the district court reveals Carver has failed to
meet his heavy burden of establishing the district court abused its sentencing
discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ."

C.

kl

Carver Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing Sentence
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise

of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of
discretion.

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011);

State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted).
A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kl at 875-76, 253 P.3d at 312-13; State

v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001).
First-degree murder is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of
fixed life imprisonment. l.C. § 18-4004. Because the fixed life sentence imposed
upon Carver's conviction is within the statutory limit, Carver bears the burden on
appeal of showing that his sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
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598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).

On appeal, the question before this

Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, whether the district
court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d
217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707,
710 (Ct. App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312
("[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court
will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with
its own.").

Although Carver's sentence is unquestionably weighty, he has not

demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in the district court's
determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not only warranted, but
also necessary, under the facts of this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:

"To impose a fixed life sentence

requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the
individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253
P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross,
132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)) (internal quotations and
emphasis omitted); accord State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 388, 179 P.3d 346,
351 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 P.2d 926,
929 (Ct. App. 1988)) (a fixed life sentence "should be regarded as a sentence
requiring a 1·1igh degree of certainty - certainty that the nature of the crime
demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the
perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released."). This "high
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degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that
it demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if
the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death
is the only feasible means of protecting society." Perez, 145 Idaho at 388, 179
P.3d at 351 (emphasis added). The record clearly shows the existence of both of
these circumstances in this case.
In imposing sentence on Carver, the district court considered all of the
information before it, including the presentence report, prior rehabilitative efforts,
Carver's age, history of drug use, treatment of D.B. and lack of emotion toward
D.B.'s condition and ultimate death, and the arguments of counsel. (R., pp.153155.) The court also considered the objectives of sentencing and concluded the
nature of the offense and Carver's history, which indicates he is not amenable to
rehabilitative efforts, warranted a fixed life sentence. (R., pp.155-156; Tr., Vol. 4,
p.810, L.13- p.813, L.4.)
Carver claims the court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed life
sentence, asserting the court "failed to give sufficient consideration to the
mitigating factors present in his case, including [his] relative youth, and when it
concluded that aggravating factors were present when they were not."
(Appellant's Brief, p.27.) With respect to mitigating factors, Carver specifically
identifies his "relative youth" and claims this was the "most obviously-ignored
mitigating factor." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) This assertion is contradicted by the
record.

Not only did defense counsel specifically emphasize Carver's age in
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presenting argument at sentencing (Tr., Vol. 4, p.806, Ls.11-22), the district court
specifically noted Carver's age as a consideration (R., p.153).
Carver's related claim that, because of his age, he should be given "the
chance to benefit from the rehabilitative programs available in prison" and allow
the parole board, in its "discretion" to decide whether he should "return to society
some day" does not establish an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's Brief, p.32;
see also p.35 (claiming his fixed life sentence is "blatantly excessive" and "he
should be afforded the opportunity, at some point, to present evidence to the
parole board that he is no longer a risk to the community" and the "parole board
could then consider this evidence, and exercise its discretion, before giving him
the opportunity, when he is ready, to return to the community"). In Windom, the
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the "view that the potential future action of parole
authorities ought to be considered in the analysis of the propriety of a fixed life
sentence imposed in the exercise of judicial discretion," noting the "Legislature
has conferred the power and responsibility to impose determinate sentences
upon the judiciary, including determinate life sentences." Windom, 150 Idaho at
878 n.1, 253 P.3d at 315 n.1.
The Court in Windom also explained the necessity of affording deference
to a district court's view of a defendant's rehabilitative potential:
The task of sentencing is a difficult one. When evaluating
the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, trial judges are asked
to make a probabilistic determination of a human being's likely
future behavior. The reality is that a sentencing judge will never
possess sufficient information about the defendant's character, life
circumstances and past behavior so as to project future behavior
with unerring accuracy. To the contrary, the factual determination
of the defendant's probability of re-offense will always be based on

27

limited data. This extraordinarily difficult task is made more difficult
because it is merely one factor to be considered by the sentencing
judge - and a subordinate consideration at that. State v. Moore, 78
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (19856) ("Rehabilitation is not
the controlling consideration.... The primary consideration is, and
presumptively always will be, the good order and protection of
society.").
Sentencing is less a science than an art. Judges face a
different uncertainty principle than physicists: they must make a
factual finding of the probability of future criminal behavior based
upon limited data. In so doing, they draw upon their accumulated
experience. It is precisely because of the difficulty of fashioning an
objectively appropriate sentence that this Court has adopted a
deferential standard of review of sentencing decisions.
Windom, 150 Idaho at 879, 253 P.3d at 316.
Based on the data available to the district court regarding failed
rehabilitative opportunities afforded to Carver, it was well within the court's
discretion to conclude Carver lacked rehabilitative potential given Carver's
abysmal record in this regard. That the district court did not accept, as Carver
wanted him to, that his age necessarily meant he could be rehabilitated and he
should therefore be sentenced to a term less than fixed life, does not establish an
abuse of discretion, particularly given the absence of any evidence establishing
Carver could be rehabilitated. 7

7

Carver's self-serving assertion to the presentence investigator that "he
understands his behavior was inappropriate" with respect to his prior "disciplinary
write-ups" while in the juvenile corrections system "and now [he] handles things
differently" (PSI, p.15) does not, as Carver claims on appeal, "reveal[] that [he]
is capable of improving his character and growing into a person worthy of the
opportunity to return to society at some point" (Appellant's Brief, p.34). Indeed,
nothing about Carver's actions since he was paroled on December 22, 2010, less
than three months prior to D.B.'s murder, supports a claim that he has any idea
how to behave or "handle things" appropriately.
28

Carver also relies on United States Supreme Court Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in juvenile cases in support of his claim that his age demands a
lesser sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-34 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct.
2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010); and Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005)). Such reliance is misplaced not only because Carver was
not a juvenile at the time of the offense and the offense he committed was
murder, but also because the Court in Windom specifically stated it is "neither
necessary nor appropriate to confuse our well-established standard of review of
a trial court's sentencing decision by selective application of statements found in
decisions [like Graham and Roper that] defin[e] the scope of the Eighth
Amendment protections." 150 Idaho at 880 n.2, 253 P.3d at 317 n.2. 8
Applying the correct, and deferential legal standard set forth in Windom,
Carver has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in concluding
that "in order to protect society the defendant must be incarcerated without
parole." (R.,p.156.)
The egregious nature of the offense also supports a fixed life sentence.
Windom, 150 Idaho at 880, 253 P.3d at 317. As noted by the district court, "The
crime was horrific in that it was committed against a defenseless 3 year old child
and the punishment should fit the crime." (R., p.155.) The evidence presented
at trial supports this finding. The photographs introduced at trial showed a small
child covered in bruises. The pain Carver undoubtedly inflicted on D.B. before he
8

Curiously, Carver never cites the Supreme Court's opinion in Windom in his
brief, but instead relies on the 1988 Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Eubank,
114 Idaho 635, 759 P.2d 926 (Ct. App. 1988), for the standard for review of fixed
life sentences. (Appellant's Brief, p.31.)
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ultimately killed him is incomprehensible.

Carver has failed to establish the

district court abused its discretion by concluding this offense warrants a fixed life
sentence.
As for Carver's claim that the district court relied on aggravating factors
that were not present, it appears this assertion is based on the court's dim view
of Carver's

rehabilitative potential and

his "purported

lack of emotion."

(Appellant's Brief, p.35.) As noted, the district court was not required to share
Carver's view of his prospects for rehabilitation and the fact that the court did not
share those views does not mean the factor was "not present." With respect to
Carver's lack of emotion, the court noted:
From the moment the police arrived at the defendant's residence in
response to a 911 call and found the 3 year old victim not breathing
and without a heart beat the defendant has not shown any concern
or emotion for the little boy or the boy's family. It would be normal
for a person, even if he continues to maintain his innocence, to feel
sorry that the boy died and feel sorry for the boy's family. Mr.
Carver has not shown any such empathy or concern. Mr. Carver
was at the hospital in Grangeville and Spokane, Washington when
medical personnel were trying to save the little boy, but Mr. Carver
never displayed any concern for the boy or his condition.
(R., p.155.)

Carver asserts that he "has not made a public spectacle of emotion is not
indicative of whether he felt grief about [D.B.'s] death." (Appellant's Brief, p.35.)
Carver also argues that because D.B.'s mother also failed to "display[ ] her
emotions ... reveals that there is nothing particularly significant about [his own]
lack of a public emotional display." (Appellant's Brief, p.35 and n.16.) Carver
also tries to claim that he "wept" during his interviews with law enforcement.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.35-36.) According to Carver, the district court "appears to
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have confused the concept of 'displaying emotion' with 'expressing remorse for
criminal conduct"' and, he asserts, "the district court's requirement that [he]
express remorse . . . would require him to stop maintaining his innocence."
(Appellant's Brief, p.36.) All of Carver's arguments on this point lack merit.
Carver's suggestion, made for the first time on appeal, that he expresses
grief in ways other than making a "public spectacle of emotion," is unsupported
by anything in the record and neither William Shakespeare's nor Voltaire's views
on grief mean Carver himself feels any sort of empathy or concern for the fact
that a child died in his care.

(Appellant's Brief, p.35.) And, the sad fact that

D.B.'s mother may have shared some of Carver's behaviors does not make
either of their actions insignificant.
Carver's claim that he "wept" due to the emotion he felt about D.B. is also
disingenuous. While there was undoubtedly testimony that he "cried" when he
was confronted by law enforcement with the fact that they did not believe his
story, those officers clarified that they saw no actual tears and the court was
certainly not required to conclude that any emotion displayed by Carver was
attributable to grief over D.B. as opposed to emotion related to the fact that he
was a suspect in D.B.'s death and was going to have his parole revoked. (Tr.,
Vol. 2, p.287, L.14 - p.288, L.2; Vol. 3, p.665, L.16 - p.666, L.9.) Finally, the
record clearly reflects the district court was not "confused" on this issue; the court
specifically noted that it was not a mutually exclusive proposition to maintain
innocence or show concern for the loss of life.
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(R., p.155.)

Carver's claim

otherwise represents another disingenuous assertion in support of his sentencing
argument.
The district court considered the information presented to it and imposed a
reasonable sentence. Carver has failed to show otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Carver's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 28th day of December 2012.

JESSI AM. LORELLO
Def ut Attorney General
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